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1 Introduction
[Motivation] Stress is a feeling everybody knows. There are just those days where there are
simply too many demands that fall upon oneself and it is just impossible to respond to them
all. Stress is a topic that has always received a lot of attention. Whether one reads handbooks
of stress written more than 30 years ago, or looks at current discussions in science and in
the media, it is an amazingly and maybe disturbingly popular topic. Selye (1982, p. 7) from
a medical perspective wrote: Nowadays, everyone seems to be talking about stress. The
psychologists Lazarus and Folkman (1984, p. 1) wrote: It is virtually impossible today to read
extensively in any of the biological or social sciences without running into the term stress.
Public discussion today covers various topics related to stress, such as the burnout syndrome,
happiness and overall life satisfaction, the increasing use of therapeutic and medical services to
cope with stress and the like.2
[The open issue] Despite the huge relevance of stress that hardly anyone would deny, an
economic analysis of stress does not seem to exist. This is even more surprising as it is widely
1Contact details: Klaus Wälde, Johannes-Gutenberg University Mainz, Mainz School of Management and
Economics, Jakob-Welder-Weg 4, 55131 Mainz, Germany, fax + 49.6131.39-23827, phone + 49.6131.39-20143,
waelde@uni-mainz.de. I would like to thank Pierre Cahuc, Ernst Fehr, Drew Fudenberg, Johannes Haushofer,
Frank Heinemann, Sendhil Mullainathan, Henning Müller, Nick Netzer, Rémi Piatek and Robert Sugden for
comments and discussions and David Laibson for encouragment. Special thanks go to colleagues from psychology
departments, including Brad Bushman, Andreas Eder, Boris Eglo¤, Laurenz Meier and Agnes Moors. The paper
also gained from the CESifo behavioural economics conference and from seminar presentations at, inter alia,
Aarhus University, Humboldt University, NYU, Polytechnique Paris and TU Vienna.
2A German governmental agency issued a stress report (Lohmann-Haislah, 2012) and a major health in-
surance company put a special emphasis on stress in its annual report (DAK, 2014). The French government
issued a report on happiness (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi, 2008) and Helliwell, Layard and Sachs (2013) edited a
world happiness report. Both of these reports are full of references regarding the concept of stress. The OECD
(2014), more generally speaking, argues that mental illness poses a large economic burden on society, despite
rising expenditure on mental health.
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accepted that many economic events generate large numbers of stressors. Biased technological
change, distributional e¤ects caused by globalization, unemployment or the great recession are
undeniably (at least at a subjective level) related to the stress of individuals. What is missing
in economics is a concept of stress that can be integrated into standard economic analyses.3
[The objectives] The rst and foremost objective of this paper is, therefore, to provide
a formal framework within which to think about stress and its implications. This approach
follows a desire to expose how <existing views> are wrong (all quotes in this paragraph
are from Rabin, 2013a) or, to put it a bit more positively, to work out what existing views
actually mean. Theories developed in most social sciences are what could be called imprecise
theories. Models of stress and coping developed in other disciplines lack mathematical rigor
and precision. This makes it just harder to identify aws. Translating standard psychological
views into an otherwise mainstream economic model allows us to see their limits that can guide
us in further improvements. To make the point most clearly: What is a stressor, what is stress,
what is coping once these concepts are cast into a formal framework?4
[The setup] The model in section 2 represents stress as a subjective feeling captured by a
stochastic state variable which increases in the presence of stressful events (stressors), and falls
via coping measures and in the presence of pleasant events. The process starting with the stres-
sor and ending with stress is an example of what psychologists call an appraisal process, i.e. the
evaluation of events with respect to their implications for well-being for the person facing
the stressors (Lazarus, 1999, p. 75 ).5 Stressors are kept exogenous in our setup and appraisal
is modelled by certain functional forms of stressors. Coping measures are endogenous and (at
least partially) optimally chosen by the individual. The e¤ects of stressful or pleasant events
and of coping measures on stress depend on the personality of the person under consideration.6
Starting with stressors and following a distinction made in psychology, we distinguish be-
tween events that occur relatively often and others that occur more rarely. Historically, the
more rare events were seen as the classic sources of stress. A widely cited list of stressors was
compiled by Holmes and Rahe (1967) in their Social Readjustment Rating Scale (SRRS). This
scale includes events (in descending order of stressfulness) such as death of spouse, divorce,
jail term, red at workand so on, concluding with vacation, Christmasand minor viola-
tions of law. It was later discovered that, even in the absence of any of the 43 events listed
in the SRRS, individuals can be under high stress given daily hassles(Kanner et al., 1981)
such as losing things, dont like fellow workers, too many obligationsand the like. Our
specication for the evolution of stress allows for both types of events, reecting the fact that
empirically both of them matter.7
When modelling the e¤ect of a stressor on the stress level of an individual, we allow for
intermediate cognitive processes of the individual experiencing a certain stimulus and displaying
the response (Lazarus, 1993). These appraisal processes are captured in our setup by parameters
which describe how a stressor translates into stress.
3There are some empirical analyses using measures of stress to understand the impact on birth weight
(Camacho, 2008), to understand the link between parental stress and child outcomes (Baker et al. 2008), the
e¤ect of housing vouchers on mental health (Kling et al. 2007) and the gender di¤erences in abilities to cope
with stress (Kling et al. 2005). The theoretical analysis by Caplin and Leahy (2001) use stressful events as an
example of how anxiety can be built up (e.g. a medical procedure, see Caplin and Leahy, 2004). Yaniv (1995)
presents a static model of worker health where the rm takes the e¤ects of a stressful environment into account.
None of these analyses studies the evolution of stress over time or the role of appraisal and coping.
4The technical answer in chronological order: an exogenous parameter, a state variable and a control variable.
5See the main part and footnote 19 for more elaboration and references on appraisal theory.
6As will be discussed in the main text, the personality measures used here are deepermeasures of person-
ality than measures such as the Big 5. For the background in psychology, see John et al. (2008). Applications
in economics are discussed, for example, by Borghans et al. (2009).
7To be fair, there are many little things in lifethat can reduce stress. In fact, Kanner et al. (1981) also
inquire about upliftsin their questionaire.
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The channel through which stress is detrimental to an individuals utility is motivated by
the literature on cognitive load.8 This literature builds on the view that cognitive processes
can best be understood by using the concept of a working memory.9 This working memory
has a certain capacity for processing information. Stress, anxiety or other strong feelings imply
cognitive load which reduces the amount of resources available for other information processing.
To make a simple example, stress reduces the ability to work intensively or focus on other
important activities. In fact, we will model the negative e¤ects of stress on individual well-
being by modelling the performance-reducing e¤ect of stress. Stress reduces e¤ective labour
supply at work.
Turning to coping strategies, standard classications distinguish between emotion focused
copying strategy as opposed to problem focused behaviour, which addresses the stressor
itself (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, ch. 6).10 Other classic categories include functionalvs.
dysfunctionalapproaches, whereas modern views of coping often include a distinction between
automaticand controlledprocesses (e.g. Connor-Smith et al. 2000, Skinner and Zimmer-
Gembeck, 2007).11
Coping behaviour in our model can easily be understood using these categories. The feature
of coping we emphasize is its stress-reducing nature. We, therefore, model an emotion focused
coping strategy chosen by an individual that reacts optimally to subjective stress levels. This
strategy reduces stress in a gradual and deterministic fashion. This is a controlledprocess.
At the same time, we allow the individual to be overwhelmed by stress experiences. Being
overwhelmed triggers behaviour that can be understood as uncontrolled and that leads to
a discrete and fast reduction of stress. This reects the automatic process of the above
categorization. As examples for the smooth coping style, think of sorting things out, talking to
a friendor doing sports. The more violent and less controlled behaviour stands for emotional
outbursts taking the form of yelling, making gestures while driving the car, getting drunk,
becoming aggressive and the like.
Section 3 models individual behaviour as an optimal stopping problem.12 Stress evolves
continuously with discrete jumps at random points in time and is controlled by smooth coping.
Discrete increases and decreases are caused by negative or positive surprises.13 When the stress
level is too high, an emotional outburst occurs. The outburst reduces the stress level by a
discrete amount. Smooth coping allows the reduction of stress in a continuous way. Coping is
optimally chosen and takes the e¤ect of random surprises and outbursts into account.
[Findings] Given optimal behaviour, stress evolves smoothly most of the time, but is occa-
sionally disrupted by surprises and outbursts. Section 4 nds that coping behaviour depends
crucially on the interplay between the situation (stressors) and the individuals personality.
8This literature consists of various relatively independent substrands. An introduction from the perspective
of learning is provided by Paas et al. (2003). A recent contribution to the understanding of the e¤ect of cognitive
load on performance is by Ho¤mann et al. (2013). The role of cognitive load in the context of anxiety and
performance is surveyed in Derakshan and Eysenck (2009).
9The view goes back to Baddeley and Hitch (1974). See, for example, Smith and Kosslyn (2007, ch. 6) for
an introduction.
10Economics is full of problem-focused coping styles. An unemployed worker putting e¤ort into searching for
a job would be one such example.
11This follows the tradition of dual-process models used in psychology more widely. See Chaiken and Trope
(1999) for an overview and Strack and Deutsch (2004) or Sherman et al. (2008) for more recent contributions.
12Optimal stopping features arise as emotional outbursts imply xed utility costs in our setup. In this sense,
the paper is related to, for example, Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Dixit
(1989). See Stokey (2008) for an excellent introduction. Optimal stopping problems in the presence of Poisson
uncertainty (as in the present analysis) is treated in Dixit and Pindyck (1994 ch 5.B) and was used by Ahlin
and Shintani (2007) or Chen and Funke (2005).
13Surprises occur when the expected outcome of some event di¤ers from the subjective expectation of an
individual with respect to this outcome. This is related to the disappointment literature of Loomes and Sugden
(1986), Bell (1985) and others.
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While a strong negative surprise can induce any individual to display uncontrolled coping styles,
our setup suggests the classication of individuals into stress-proneand stress-resistantcat-
egories. Stress-resistant individuals never display emotional outbursts in the absence of negative
surprises. Stress-prone individuals can display emotional outbursts even when there are no neg-
ative surprises. Daily hassles alone can lead to overwhelming stress experiences. Yet, this is
not necessarily the case. Even stress-prone individuals can be good stabilizers, i.e. they can
experience reducing stress levels over time. This is conditional on their initial stress level. If
the latter is too high, they turn into bad stabilizers and will foreseeably display an emo-
tional outburst at some deterministically given future point in time. Due to this dependence of
behaviour on the current stress level, stress-prone individuals display more volatile behaviour
than stress-resistant individuals.
An outburst theorem will then relate situational and personality parameters to allow a
prediction under which conditions and outburst will occur. The growth rate of stress, the
individuals tolerance level (above which outbursts occur) and the current stress level all play
a role.
[Applications] Based on these general ndings, we use our framework to study various
issues that commonly arise in a context of uncontrolled and aggressive behaviour. We rst
ask what would happen if individuals could control their tolerance level. Surprisingly, we nd
that outbursts occurring early, i.e. at low stress-levels, have higher chances of permanently
reducing the stress level of an individual than emotional outbursts that take place only later.
Suppressing outbursts is, therefore, not a good idea. We thereby provide a rationale for common
recommendations to not bottle ones anger up inside or to allow for air-cleaning angry
outbursts (Bushman et al., 2001).
Second, we compute the frequency with which outbursts occur when a bad stabilizer is
caught in an outburst cycle. We nd that a higher growth rate of stress and a higher tolerance
level lead to a higher frequency of outbursts. This also points to the fact that high tolerance
levels might not be a desirable characteristic. We also nd that the intensity of an outburst,
i.e. the amount by which stress is reduced as a consequence of the outburst, has ambiguous
e¤ects on the frequency of outbursts. One could believe that a highly intense outburst is
desirable, i.e. it would decrease the frequency of outbursts. At the same time, however, when
outbursts reduce stress by a large amount, the individual will anticipate this and reduce costly
smooth stress-reduction activities. This, in turn, increases the frequency of outbursts.
Third, we ask how individuals react to positive and negative surprises. It again turns
out that the distinction between stress-prone and stress-resistant individuals is crucial. Stress-
resistant individuals react to temporary shocks in a transient way. A negative surprise increases
the stress level, which then gradually falls over time to return to normallevels again. A stress-
prone individual, however, can permanently su¤er from a negative shock. While experiencing
low stress levels and displaying correspondingly smooth stress-reduction behaviour before the
negative surprise, the surprise can push this individual into an outburst cycle. Leaving this
outburst cycle then requires major interventions: Either a positive surprise is experienced or
daily stressors are reduced to a minimum such that the individual has a chance to gradually
reduce stress levels. This explains the large heterogeneity observed in individual behaviour
after major stressful events. While some people return to normal as if nothing has happened,
others persistently su¤er from a temporary event.
Our next application, a rst step towards a theory of therapy, departs from one of the
most fundamental building blocks in economics and also from (parts of) personality psychology.
By contrast, this application is very much in line with clinical psychology and therapy studies
more generally speaking. We ask what would happen if individuals could change their tastes
and attitudes. There are powerful arguments in economics that tastes should be regarded as
stable and maybe even identical across individuals (Stigler and Becker, 1977). By contrast,
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more modern views argue that preferences are inuenced by social circumstances (Fehr and
Ho¤, 2011) and are therefore endogenous. Personality psychologists also seem to be moving
from the more traditional view of stable personalities to personalities that change over time
(e.g. Specht et al., 2011), a fact also stressed by Borghans et al. (2008). Clinical psychology has
always stressed the importance of reappraisal of certain outcomes (stressors in our application)
to improve emotional stability (e.g. Allen et al, 2008, p. 230). We model this clinical psychology
approach by inquiring into the e¤ects of changes in personality parameters. If individuals were
able (say, by therapy) to change their personality, how would they want to do this?14
Our nal application is more forward-looking and goes beyond our analysis of stress
and coping. Our paper suggests model-consistent denitions of personality characteristics
(e.g. stress-prone vs. stress-resistant individuals). These characteristics are well-dened func-
tions of personality parameters. Based on modern factor analysis (see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006
or Conti et al., 2014), we will discuss how these parameters can be structurally estimated. An
interpretation of personality characteristics would then be much easier and more disciplined (by
our theoretical model) than personality measures that are based on purely statistical methods.
Future empirical work would have to show how our theoretically grounded personality measures
can be estimated from answers to standard questions in commonly available questionnaires.
[Related literature] In spirit, we see our paper in the tradition of the strand of behavioural
economics that uses ideas from psychological research to better understand human behaviour.
One can trace back the formal tradition at least to Strotz (1956) on time-inconsistencies, with
the more recent new interest inspired by Laibson (1997).15 Our interest in stress places our
analysis into the modern literature analysing emotions from an economic perspective. Economic
analyses of emotions include ex-post emotions such as regret, disappointment and rejoicing
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1986, Gul, 1991), ex-ante emotions such as joy and fear (Caplin
and Leahy, 2001, 2004, K½oszegi, 2006, Becker and Rubinstein, 2011) and immediate emotions
or visceral factors. Examples are desire and compulsion (Laibson, 2001, Bernheim and Rangel,
2004 and Brocas and Carrillo, 2008) or hunger and thirst (Loewenstein, 2000). A nal group
consists of belief-based emotions either in psychological games (Geanakoplos et al., 1989), for
which an application studies guilt in marriage (Dufwenberg, 2002), or in non-strategic settings
as in Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who analyse self-condence. See Wälde (2015) for a more
extensive review of emotion research in economics.
Given the behavioural predictions of our analysis, the paper is also related and generalizes
analyses based on cues, dual-self views of human decision making or on time-inconsistent behav-
iour. In some broad interpretation, these models allow to understand behaviour à la Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde: One and the same individual sometimes displays very reasonable, rational and
relaxed behaviour while, at other times, the individual acts as if it was another person. Where
does this apparently inconsistent behaviour of individuals come from?16
Laibsons cue theory (2001) explains how cue-dependent preferences allow the understanding
of such an erratic behaviour. Impulsive behaviour of individuals can be understood by cues
a¤ecting their preferences (without touching meta-preferences, which are stable). Accumulated
cues can induce an individuals marginal utility from consumption to go up rather quickly
and strongly. Such a sudden craving for a certain good leads to behaviour that is very
di¤erent from situations displaying no or other cues. In the framework of Bernheim and Rangel
(2004), individuals are sometimes in a coldmode where decision making about consumption
behaviour is rational. When triggered by some cue (whose probability to occur depends on
14I am grateful to Ernst Fehr for having brought up this question.
15The link between psychology and economics is, of course, much older, starting at least with Benthams (1789,
1970, p. 11) two souvereign masters, pain and pleasure. For a revival of the link between subjective well-being
(happiness) and choice, see inter alia Benjamin et al. (2012) or Rayo and Becker (2007) and Kahneman, Wakker
and Sarin (1997). A short history of bounded-rationality models is provided by Harstad and Selten (2013).
16I am grateful to Nick Netzer for suggesting this perspective and for discussions of these aspects.
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current and past decisions of the individual), individuals are in a hotmode and act against
their preferences.
In dual-self models, two selves are in conict with each other and play a game over a certain
behaviour (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012). This structure can explain many empirical
regularities observed in the context of self-control problems. A central component of these
models are costs of self-control. When they are high, there can be procrastination and delay
(as in ODonoghue and Rabin, 1999, 2001). High self-control costs also reduce the saving rate
of an individual. By contrast, di¤erent behaviour in the sense of higher saving rates can be
observed when self-control costs are lower, e.g. when cognitive load is lower. Intrapersonal
tension in the principal-agent setup of Brocas and Carrillo (2008) is modeled for the case of
temptations by a discrepancy between one utility function capturing the true instantaneous
payo¤(principal) and another utility function describing the individuals motivation (agent).
When there is incomplete information, behaviour of the individual either follows a smooth
consumption rule for the tempting good that maximizes motivational utility or it is restricted
by a consumption cap. These di¤erences in behaviour can result from changes in the valuation
of the tempting good or from changes in relative prices or endowment.
In models of time-inconsistent behaviour, we can also see abrupt changes in behaviour. In
Strotz(1956) continuous-time analysis, an individual can be argued to follow a plan in some
smooth way up to the point where he reconsiders the plan and readjusts his behaviour in a
discrete way (see his gure 2). In discrete time setups (Laibson, 1997), an individual makes
a plan just to realize one period later that s/he should not follow this plan (unless s/he is a
sophisticated time-inconsistent person as in ODonoghue and Rabin, 1999). In the absence of
any self-commitment devices (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006, 2012, Ali, 2011), any revision of
early plans leads to a strong and sudden change in observable behaviour.
In our setup, we also see two apparently inconsistent behaviours of individuals. At points,
an individual appears very calm and reasonable, at other points, the individual acts in an
aggressive way. However, we do not base this upon random cues, changes in parameters,
cognitive load or revisions of decisions. Behaviour of individuals is rather the outcome of
an accumulation of feelings resulting from various previous events. Smooth and controlled
behaviour can endogenously be followed by less-desirable outbursts and vice versa (see, for
example, the outburst cycles below) even in the absence of any external events.17
2 The model
2.1 Origins of stress
Emotional tension (which we use interchangeably with stress) can be caused by a multitude
of events. Following a classic distinction in psychology, we distinguish between two types of
events. Those that occur only rarely and those that occur more frequently, say daily. The
stressfulness of rare events can be measured by the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Holmes
and Rahe, 1967, Hobson et al., 1998). In decreasing order of stressfulness, rare events start
from death of spouse, divorce, jail term, red at workand end with vacation, Christmas
and minor violations of law. More frequent events can be called daily hassles and upliftsin
the tradition of Kanner et al. (1981) and include losing things, dont like fellow workers, too
many obligationsand others.
17Our economic approach to stress also contributes to the psychological literature. The literature on emotion
regulation (see, for example, Gross, 1998, 2008, Gross and Feldman-Barrett, 2011) has considerably enlarged
the earlier ndings by building on and extending Lazaruswork. According to Gross (2008, p. 505), one
intriguing puzzle is why people use one emotion regulation strategy rather than another. Our model provides
standard conditions (relative costs and benets) under which one or the other regulation strategy is chosen.
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Our model describes the randomness of the rare events by a Poisson process with a random
jump level h (t) and an exogenous arrival rate . The jump h (t) can be positive or negative
according to some well-dened distribution. Our individual forms expectations about the jump
level. This expected level  can be a subjective measure or the mathematically correct mean.
The surprise g (t) implied by a rare event that occurs at t is then given by
g (t)  h (t)  : (1)
In the spirit of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden (1986) and others, we call a positive surprise,
dened by g (t) > 0; elation and a negative surprise disappointment. Both elation and disap-
pointment are measured relative to the mean :We consider the realization to be an exogenous
and objective quantity, while the expected value  is a personality measure of the person under
consideration.18
As an example, let an increment of the Poisson process denote the point in time when a
paper is accepted for publication. Let further h (t) represent the quality of the accepting journal
or the number of citations a paper gets, say, within the rst two years after publication. When
the quality or the number is very high and the subjective expectation is modest (i.e.  is not
too high), the individual is positively surprised.
In addition to this rare source for emotional tension, there is a daily ow of events that has
an impact on a person. These events imply certain demands p (t) ; the stressors, which have to
be met given the abilities a (t) of the individual. When hasslesdominate relative to uplifts,
p (t) is positive. Just as with surprises, let us assume that pressure and abilities are objective
quantities. We call p (t) =a (t) the intensity of the stressor p (t) :
As an example, consider p (t) to represent the number of emails an individual receives per
day. If the ability a (t) to reply to emails is high, the intensity of the stressor emailis low. If
an individual is not that good at communicating by email, the intensity of the stressor email
is high.
We model the e¤ect of stressors on emotional tension by taking a clear causal view. Stres-
sors cause (a change of) emotional tension. The mechanism through which stressors increase
emotional tension follows appraisal theorywhere emotions are elicited by evaluations (ap-
praisals) of events and situations(Roseman and Smith, 2001, p. 3).19 The appraisal process is
strongly inuenced by personal characteristics of the person under consideration. Support for
this modelling choice comes from appraisal analyses that take individual heterogeneity into ac-
count (for a discussion of the related aspects, see e.g. Kuppens et al. (2008), Scherer and Brosch
(2009) and Tong (2010) or from the literature that looks at the cognition-emotion relation fo-
cusing on personality or clinical aspects (see Lewis, 2005, p. 171 for a short overview). We
capture this appraisal process by individual-specic functions F (p (t) =a (t) ; :) and G (g (t) ; :)
that specify how the intensity of daily hassles or rare events inuence the evolution of stress.
There is systematic empirical evidence from eld experiments on the stress-reduction e¤ect
of positive surprises. Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) study the e¤ect of random unconditional
cash transfers of around $400 or $1500 on households in Kenya. They nd that for the large
transfer, there was a signicant reduction of the households stress level.20 Haushofer and
18One can think about  as a reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) of our individual indicating what
she nds appropriateconcerning the outcome of h (t) : Such a reference point could be made endogenous as
in Gul (1991) or Köszegi and Rabin (2006). See prop. 5 in the section on therapy below for further elaboration
of the personality view.
19Appraisal is a highly complex process which we do not model in all details. Ellsworth and Scherer (2003)
provide a list of dimensions along which individuals evaluate a certain event. For a full-scale summary of
appraisal theory, see Scherer et al. (2001), a recent analysis of the role of appraisal in emotion is in Moors and
Scherer (2012). A comparison to alternative views is e.g. in Roseman and Smith (2001) or Lewis (2005, p. 170).
20While households receiving the $400 transfer had a lower stress level as well, it was not signicantly lower
relative to the treatment group receiving no transfer. This could be due to expectations  rising immediately
when a representative of a foreign NGO contacts an inhabitant of a rural village in a poor country.
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Fehr (2014) summarize several further studies concluding that cash transfers reduce distress
(p. 864). If we are willing to consider random positive cash transfers as positive surprises, this
is strong systematic support for our setup. Evidence for stress-increasing e¤ects of negative
surprises is just as strong (see again Haushofer and Fehr, 2014, and the studies reported therein):
Whether one looks at bad weather conditions for farmers in Kenya or job-loss for Swedish
workers, these events all lead to an increase in the stress levels of individuals.
2.2 The e¤ect of stress on individual well-being
What are the channels through which stress a¤ects well-being of an individual? Whether looking
at semi-popular sources (e.g. www.stress.org/stress-e¤ects) or at various scientic literatures,
there are long lists of how stress reduces ones general well-being. Stressed individuals enjoy
food less, play less with kids, no longer enjoy or therefore skip playing soccer and so on. There
are also various bodily symptoms (like headache, dizziness, sweating, sleeplessness and other).
We capture these direct negative e¤ects by letting stress negatively a¤ect the utility level of an
individual.21
There is a lot of evidence, however, that stress also a¤ects the individual in more sophis-
ticated, yet not less important, ways. One of these indirect channels is the e¤ect of stress on
performance via cognitive load. The argument is simple: We start from the general view of
human mental processes (see Smith and Kosslyn, 2007, esp. ch. 6 as a starting point) that an
individual is endowed with a certain amount of working memoryM: This working memory can
be used for various purposes of which some are chosen consciously by an individual while oth-
ers are more automatically determined. In our setup, the appraisal process evoked by stressors
is one such example of an automatic, exogenous, allocation of working memory resources. As
stressors are exogenous to the individual, the amount of working memory used for the appraisal
process is exogenous as well.
Generally speaking, one can distinguish between low-level and high-level appraisal. Low-
level appraisal tends to be more automatic and preattentive while high-level appraisal requires
attentional and working memory resources (Kalisch et al., 2006). Most of the examples for
daily hasslesor rare eventsclearly require high-level appraisal. Losing the car key on the
way towards an important meeting requiring a one-hour drive requires weighing various options
from not showing upto going by taxi. Similar working-memory intensive considerations are
required after rare events like divorce and even Christmas requires lots of thinking. We
therefore capture this pre-emption of the working memory by stressors by assuming that the
working memory capacity required by the individual for appraisal is given by M (W ) ; where
M 0 (W ) > 0, i.e. the higher the stress level W , the more costly appraisal processes are.
To understand the e¤ect on performance, one then simply needs to complete the working
memory constraint: What is left of the working memory can be used for everyday activities like,
taking the example of a performance measure, putting e¤ort into work, M (e). The memory
resource constraint of our individual therefore reads
M (W ) +M (e) = M: (2)
Returning to consumption and income of our individual, this constraint implies that con-
sumption is a falling function of stress. Equating consumption with income, c = wl (e), where
w is the wage rate and l (e) is e¤ective labour supply as a function of e¤ort e, consumption
21Following the concepts of experienced vs. decision utility (see e.g. Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1986 or
Kahneman et al., 1997), we are in the Bentham-tradition and allow non-observables to enter the utility function
describing hedonic experience of an individual. For a broad and thorough discussion of this distinction and
many other aspects concerning current economic methodology, see Caplin and Schotter (2008).
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rises in e¤ort. As e¤ort falls in stress, consumption is a falling function of stress, c = c (W ) :22
If we are willing to make a simple assumption between memory and e¤ort in (2), i.e. if we
assume M (e) = e1=" with " > 0; the amount of e¤ort that can be provided amounts to
e = (M  M (W ))" : Consumption is then given by
c = wl ([M  M (W )]") (3)
To summarize this cognitive load idea in a very simple way: performance at work goes down
when an individual is kept busy thinking about many other non-job related issues, i.e. when
the individual just nds it hard to focus.23
Both the direct level and the indirect level of stress suggest that the instantaneous utility
function is a function of the consumption level and of the level of stress. We denote it by
u (c;W ) and let it rise in consumption and fall in stress.
Before continuing, let us note that there is a huge literature on cognitive load in psychology,
in experimental economics and elsewhere which strongly supports our modelling approach. In
psychology, Sweller (1988) is the classic reference for cognitive load theory and learning (see
Paas et al., 2003 for a more recent review). According to these ndings, cognitive load reduces
learning. Eysenck and Calvo (1992) in their processing e¢ ciency theoryand later in their
attentional control theory(Eysenck et al., 2007) argue that the primary e¤ect of anxiety in
stressful situations is to pre-empt some of the processing and storage resources of the working
memory system(Eysenck and Calvo, 1992, p. 415). Ho¤mann et al. (2013) provide a short
literature overview in their introduction showing that accuracy of judgements generally falls
under cognitive load.24
In economics, cognitive load is modeled by Fudenberg and Levine (2006) as a parameter
for the cost of self control in their dual-self model. One of their motivations is the self-control
experiment by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) that show that individuals have a higher tendency to
choose a chocolate cake rather than a fruit salad when they have to perform cognitively demand-
ing tasks like remembering seven-digit (rather than two-digit) numbers. In terms of our mental
resource constraint (2) remembering seven-digit numbers takes up more memory resources
(M (W ) is higher) as when remembering two-digit numbers. As a consequence, resourcesM (e)
left for putting e¤ort into self-control (i.e. choosing the healthy desert) are reduced.
Our approach also shares the idea of an additional resource constraint in human decision
making with other analyses, even though the modelling is di¤erent. Banerjee and Mullainathan
(2008) allow individuals to allocate one unit of attention to activities at home and at work in
a development context. This choice of allocating attention is made optimally and therefore
di¤ers from the idea here that a certain amount of resources is taken up automatically by
whatever the stress level happens to be.25 Fudenberg and Levine (2012) use the concept of
costly cognitive resources to obtain convex costs of cognitive control. Cognitive resources are a
stock (willpower) in their setup, however, which can also become negative. This di¤ers from
our resource constraint where a stock M of mental resources is available at each instant.
22This is the income-reducing e¤ect of stress on consumption. There can clearly be a consumption-increasing
e¤ect as utility from consumption can compensate for disutility from stress. Extending this setup by allowing
for savings would imply precautionary saving behaviour that would smooth consumption and would lead to self
insurance against income uctuations induced by stress.
23To make a positive example, think about adolescents or young adults falling in love. They should focus on
their education, study hard for exams or apply for jobs. Being in love just takes up all of their working memory
and no resources are left for thinking about anything else.
24To be fair, the point of Eysenck and Calvo (1992) and Ho¤mann et al. (2013) is that performance can
under specic circumstances actually increase under cognitive load as either motivation rises in stressful situ-
ations (which increases M) or individuals switch to less resource-consuming strategies. We believe that these
circumstances are more the exception than the rule.
25Limited resources are also taken into account by Mullainathan (2002) who stresses the limited capacity of
a humans memory.
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The empirical ndings of Mani et al. (2012) also strongly support our modelling approach.
They nd that cognitive performance is lower for poor farmers. This can be explained partially
by poor farmers being more stressed (measured by heart rate and blood pressure). This is
perfectly in line with a cognitive load argument as employed here.26
2.3 Coping with stress
Coping styles can be ranked according to how functional vs. dysfunctional they are. Frequent
strategies ranked in this way start with problem solvingand support seeking, continue via
emotional expressionand aggressionto end up with wishful thinkingand worry(Skinner et
al., 2003). Another categorization distinguishes between problem-focused and emotion-focused
copying styles (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). A nal important distinction central for our
approach distinguishes between automatic and controlled processes (e.g. Connor-Smith et al.
2000, Skinner and Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007).
We will model coping strategies here which are controlled and emotion-focused and which
also feature some automatic and dysfunctional properties. A standard example for controlled
emotion-focused coping activities is communication. Individuals can talk to friends, relatives or,
more systematically, to a therapist. Another example is practicing sports, especially endurance
sports which strongly reduces stress hormones. We will denote controlled coping activities
below by m (t). It will be the outcome of utility maximization as described further below.
A less controlled emotion-focused coping activity is what we call an emotional outburst.
Outbursts occur when individuals feel overwhelmed by a situation, when emotional tension is
too high and individuals cant help but explode. This can take the form of honking while
driving the car, swearing when sitting in the o¢ ce, banging ones st on the table or other.
It is a relatively short event (say, less than 5 seconds). This approach is dysfunctional in the
sense that it might be bad for the individuals environment or detrimental for the reputation of
the perpetrator. This will be modeled further below by xed utility costs. At the same time,
however, emotional outbursts also have a functional side as they reduce tension. Denoting the
instant before an emotional outburst by i ; the e¤ect of an outburst is to reduce tension by a
xed amount  > 0;
W (i) = W (i ) : (4)
Figure 1 The e¤ect of an emotional outburst on stress W (t)
26Clearly, stress does not fully explain variations in cognitive performance in Mani et al. (2013). Poverty per
se causally captures attention and thereby also reduces cognitive resources. See Mullainathan and Shar (2013)
for the broader perspective.
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Is there evidence that supports such a stress-reduction technologyas illustrated in g. 1?
One could see  as an example of the ancient idea of catharsis, a quick purication from
overwhelming feelings. There are many metaphors that suggest so. In everyday life, people in
angry situations often suggest to themselves and others to let it out, the recommendation do
not bottle your anger up inside is well-known and the idea of a air-cleaningangry outbursts
is common. Bushman et al. (2001), from where these examples were taken, follow this intuition
and device experiments that show that people reacted more aggressively when they believe
that outbursts reduce their anger. In terms of (4), people who believe that stress reduces from
W (i ) to W (i) by an outburst, choose a larger :27
There is further evidence for a positive catharsis e¤ect coming from self-reports of individ-
uals perpetrating psychological aggression as dened by the conict tactics scale(see table
3 of Straus et al., 1996) where psychological aggression includes insulting, swearing, shouting,
stomping out of the room and other. Shorey at al. (2012) report very heterogeneous results
showing that 42.6% of respondents felt less angry while 41.7% felt more angry. Some of
the perpetrators (25.7%) felt less stressed, 40.2% felt more stressed. When one computes the
average e¤ect of these outcomes (adding up the level of changes times the share of individuals
reporting this change), individuals clearly reduced stress or anger.
2.4 The dynamics of stress
We are now in a position to summarize the various components of a stressor-appraisal-stress-
coping episode in an equation that describes the dynamics of stress. We let emotional tension









   (m (t) ;W (t))

dt+G (g (t) ;W (t)) dq (t) : (5)
The rst term captures the e¤ect of demand relative to ability, p (t) =a (t). A classic denition
(Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) that was adopted by numerous authors thereafter denes stress
as the mismatch between demands of a task and the abilities of a person to cope with those
demands. Our approach follows this denition in spirit but goes beyond it by adopting a
dynamic perspective. The stressor intensity p (t) =a (t) is a source of a change of tension, not of
tension itself. Tension is a subjective feeling that can increase and decrease over time. Only in
exceptional cases does it change in a discrete way. The views of Lazarus and others sound more
static which would imply that any tension level, any stress is gone once the stressor is gone.
Here, tension persists beyond the point where the cause of tension, the stressor, was present.
Tension can be reduced subsequently.
27Common wisdom in social psychology seems to be that catharsis does not work, i.e.  would have
to be negative in our model. The modern experimental evidence supporting this claim often combines two
simultaneous interventions. One is a pureventing intervention like hitting a punching bag and the other is
a rumination intervention (Bushman, 2002). In another setup (Bushman et al., 1999, study 2, p. 371, right
column), participants were reminded of the person who had made them angry before hitting the punching bag.
As Bushman (2002) writes, cognitive neoassociation theory would suggest that aggressive thoughts activate
further aggressive thoughts which are linked to each other in an associative network. Rumination and thinking
of the other person therefore makes individuals more aggressive. Even if the pure venting intervention of boxing
had a anger-reducing e¤ect, the negative association e¤ect would more than overcompensate the boxing e¤ect.
As a conclusion (and leaving aside considerations on causality in setups with self-selection), venting of anger
makes individuals more angry.
The big di¤erence we see to our idea of an outburst is that outbursts are spontaneous acts and not a deliberate
activity. In terms of the general aggression model of Anderson and Bushman (2002, g. 2), we see outbursts
as an impulsive action and smooth coping as a thoughtful action. In all catharsis experiments, participants
are willingly performing some act (e.g. hitting). They never display some automatic reaction. Measurements
from these experiments should therefore not be used to x the sign or magnitude of : I am grateful to Brad
Bushman for comments on this issue.
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Individual ability is not the only individual characteristic which matters for how a stressor
a¤ects an individual. The intensity of a stressor, given a certain current tension level W (t), is
an argument of some increasing function F (:) : This function captures personality di¤erences
beyond di¤erences in ability. One and the same amount of relative pressure for one and the
same tension level W (t) will a¤ect one individual more than another. For two individuals i
and j; we allow that Fi (p (t) =a (t) ;W (t)) > Fj (p (t) =a (t) ;W (t)) : Note that there is strong
evidence for this view. Meier et al. (2006) study the reaction of individuals to aggression-related
cues. Individuals with low measures of agreeableness (one of the Big 5 personality measures)
reacted considerably less aggressive than the average individual.
The second term  (m (t) ;W (t)) in the deterministic part of (5) is a depreciation function
and captures the e¤ect of automatic and intentional reduction in tension. Automatic reduction
takes place as there is some natural tendency in humans to cool downover time. Absent
new stressors and given a historically given stress levels, one should expect that emotional
tension W (t) stabilizes over time to end up at some constant level. We call this mechanism
the autonomous stress reduction potential of a person. Intentional reduction of emotional
tension results from coping activities m (t) : This is a control variable of the individual and will
be optimally chosen further below.
While the rst and second term a¤ect emotional tension in a deterministic and foreseeable
way and thereby captures common everyday events, surprises come at random points in time.
The arrival of (potential) surprises is governed by a Poisson process q (t) with a given arrival
rate : As explained after (1), the surprise g (t) can be positive or negative. Given the current
tension levelW (t), a positive surprise translates into less tension. By how much tension reduces
given a positive surprise depends on personal characteristics. Likewise with negative surprises.
Some individuals have somatic responses (like heart attacks in extreme cases) while others just
seem to able to ignorenegative surprises. These characteristics are captured in the function
G (:) : Whatever the state of the world, it is an individuals evaluation G (:) that determines
how he is a¤ected by this state.
We dene emotional tension W (t) to be non-negative. An individual can either be tense
at various levels (W > 0) or completely relaxed (at W = 0). As we will assume that there
are outbursts for W (t)  W (see the sect. 3.1 below for a discussion), the range within which




: Being completely relaxed is therefore the desirable state in this
model.
One could associate absence of tension also as complete apathy or depression as opposed to
being deeply relaxed.28 Such a distinction could be modeled if a second dimension measuring
how positive or negative a feeling is were introduced. This would then follow the valence-
arousal tradition in emotion research (Russell and Barrett, 1999).29 Here, stress is seen as
something inherently negative. While this does not fully capture all aspects of stress,30 this
analysis focuses on the negative aspects of stress.
The literature on the highly pleasurable state of being in ow(e.g. Nakamura and Csik-
szentmihalyi, 2001) states that demand p (t) can be too high but also too low. When p (t) =a (t)
is just at the right level, the individual is in ow. When demands go up, the individual rst
becomes vigilant and then anxious, i.e. a mismatch in the Lazarus sense arises and stress
builds up. If demand falls below the level that is just right, an individual rst relaxes and
28In fact, Selye, who borrowed the term stressfrom physics and introduced it into medical and social sciences
argues complete freedom from stress is death(Selye, 1976, p. 137). He also developed the distinction between
positive stress (eustress) and negative stress (distress). In this language, the present paper is on distress.
29See Fontaine et al. (2007) for an argument that an additional two dimensions (potency-control and unpre-
dictability) need to be taken into account. Lerner and Keltner (2000) argue that two emotions with the same
valence can imply very di¤erent perceptions e.g. of risk.
30For an analysis of potential positive e¤ects of stress via subsequent growth processesof an individual, see
e.g. Karlsen et al. (2006) and the references therein.
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then becomes bored. One could therefore look at our lower limit of W = 0 as the state of in
owand analyse boredom as a negative value for W in future work.
3 Optimal coping
Given the origins of and means to control tension and given the e¤ect of tension on utility as
described in the previous section, we can now start thinking about how an individual behaves
optimally in such a setup.
3.1 The maximization problem
Any meaningful maximization problem requires trade-o¤s. So far, only positive e¤ects of coping
activities m (t) were discussed: Coping reduces stress and thereby increases expected utility.
Coping measures take time, however. This is true for talking to friends or to professional
therapists or for practicing sports. We therefore include utility costs from coping v (m ()) into
the instantaneous utility function.
Outbursts are also e¤ective in reducing emotional tension. At the same time, however,
emotional outbursts are associated with high immediate (e.g. reputation) costs. To model
these costs in a parsimonious and consistent way, we derive these costs from forgone time
as well. Imagine an emotional outburst is a predetermined path m () of intense shouting,
drinking, hitting or becoming violent over a period of length : The present value of utility




e [ s]v ( m ()) d:
This captures the idea that the individual is overwhelmedby circumstances such that costs
are no longer smoothly chosen.31
Given utility from consumption and two sources of costs from coping, we can dene our
utility function as
U (t) = Et
Z 1
t
e [ t] [u (c () ;W ())  v (m ())] d   ni=1e [i t]vM : (6)
We denote the points in time of outbursts by i and subtract the implied present values from
utility from consumption and smooth coping. If there are no outbursts, i.e. if i =1; there are
no costs from outbursts and the sum in the objective function disappears, i.e. equals zero.
The individual maximizes (6) subject to the constraints (5) and (4) by choosing a path
fm ()g1t of calm coping and, possibly, the instants of outbursts. These instants can be char-
acterized by the points in time f1; 2; :::g when they occur. When these points in time are
uncertain, it is much more convenient to characterize outbursts by threshold levels of state
variables (see Stokey, 2008). This means for our case that there is an outburst whenever the
tension level hits or exceeds a certain tolerance level denoted by W:32
31Card and Dahl (2011) in their study of family violence and football argue that violent behaviour can be the
outcome of utility maximizing behaviour or e.g. of arguments that escalate out of control. There are economic
models where violence is enjoyed by the perpetrator (see e.g. the unitary family model in Tur-Prats, 2015) or
comes at a cost but serves as an instrument (to signal marriage dissatisfaction) as in Bloch and Rao (2002). In
both of these papers (and in other violence papers cited therein), violence is a rational choice. Our paper thereby
provides an alternative view where violent behaviour is at least partly beyond the control of an individual.
32Stress W (t) could exceed the threshold W by an initial condition or by a negative surprise. We assume
that in both cases, a reduction by  is enough to imply W (t) < W: An extension allowing for n outbursts such
that W (t) < W only after a reduction of stress by n is possible.
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This tolerance level can be endogenous, i.e. we can let the individual decide optimally at
which level there is an outburst, or we can leave them exogenous. This choice is clearly a
matter of which feature of outbursts one would like to emphasize. In the rst case, outbursts
are modelled as a rational choice of technologies how to control tension. One would add one
optimality condition, a smooth-pasting condition, that makes W endogenous. If the discrete
technology with large costs but also large gains yields higher returns than the smooth technology
with marginal costs but also only marginal gains, there will be an outburst.33 One appealing
factor of an endogenous W is the fact that it would reduce the degrees of freedom of the model.
The outburst stress level W would be tight to personality factors of the individual which would
nd some support from personality psychology. If one believes, however, that an individual
acts sometimes beyond ones control, the assumption of an exogenous tolerance W seems
more appropriate.
From a psychological perspective, some authors dene coping mechanisms as voluntary
responses (Compas et al. 2001). Skinner and Zimmer-Gembeck (2007) include automatic
reactions, which would argue in favour of an exogenous W , into their concept of coping. If
we allow for learning, however, the two concepts can become intertwined. Carver and Connor
Smith (2010) write that distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary responses to stress
is not simple; indeed, responses that begin as intentional and e¤ortful may become automatic
with repetition. Given that we believe that our main conclusions are independent of the endo-
or exogeneity of W and that an exogenous W is more parsimonious, we stick to W as being
exogenous in our model.34 The individual anticipates in his choice of coping m (), however,
that outbursts occur at W:35
3.2 The optimal amount of coping
The above problem is a stopping problem with continuous adjustment in between the stopping
points i (see e.g. Stokey, 2008). It implies (see app. A.1) a standard rst-order condition for
calm coping m (t). It weighs the marginal gains from less tension resulting from coping with
its marginal utility costs. In addition to this condition, we obtain a new condition specic to
the stopping nature of this problem which is the value matching condition. This condition
holds for tension levels at or above the tension level where an outburst takes place, i.e. for
W (t)  W: It reads
V (W (t)) = V (W (t) )  vM (7)
and tells us that the value for all tension levels beyond the tolerance level, V (W (t)) ; must
equal the value after the outburst at the reduced tension level, V (W (t) ) ; minus the
instantaneous discrete utility costs due to the outburst, vM : The reduction in tension by 
reects the change in (4) due to an emotional outburst. The Bellman equation plus the rst-
order condition and the value matching condition describe optimal behaviour of our individual.
We now need to specify functional forms for functions F (:) ;  (:) and G (:) in (5) and on
the distributional nature of surprises in (1). Given that there is no formal analysis of stress in
psychology or economics, the functional forms suggested here are explorative in nature. This
means that we will suggest functional forms that make intuitively sense but this also means at
33The classic example, whose truth is not fully conrmed (Taubman, 2003), is the shoe banging of Nikita
Khrushchev at a 1960 UN meeting in New York when in rage about a speech of a Philippine delegate.
34This view is shared with the approach of Benhabib and Bisin (2005) who also take automatic behaviour in
their model into account. They let individuals choose, however, whether they want to act in an automatic or
in a controlled way.
35One could give the individual more control over her environment and let her choose, as one example, hours
worked. One can then easily imagine that demand p (t) rises in hours worked. As in standard labour supply
models, consumption from (3) would then also increase in hours worked. We discuss the implications of such
an extension further below once we have studied our existing setup.
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the same time that their structure needs to tested or their parameters need to be estimated in
subsequent work. The functional forms read











 (m;W ) = 0W + 1m; (8c)
G (g (t) ;W (t)) =  g (t) (8d)
The costs for smooth coping are described by a standard CES structure. The parameter
v0 > 0 will be useful for understanding optimal smooth coping later. The cost function needs
to be convex ( > 0) for our ndings to make sense. This is similar to the many quadratic
adjustment cost structures in other papers in economics.
The second functional form combines situational and personal components to describe the
source of stress. The parameter  > 0 is a personality parameter which captures the aspects
ascribed to the function F (:) above in the discussion of (5). Putting two individuals into iden-
tical circumstances, i.e. exposing them to identical ratios p=a; can lead to very heterogeneous
building up of stress. An individual with a low  will not become as tense as an individual with
a high : The ratio of pressure relative to ability is proportional to the current tension level
W: This implies that pressure corrected for ability increases tension the more, the higher ten-
sion currently is. This captures the idea that someone already relatively tense will react more
nervously, i.e. will build up tension even more when confronted with additional demands as
compared to a person with lower W:
The functional form might appear restrictive as we do not allow p=a to be a function of
time. One might wish to understand how cyclical pressure (relative to ability) due to more or
less demanding days induces stress. Examples include a deadline that is approaching vs. the
teaching term that comes to an end or the pressure in recession when a rm is about to shut
down relative to an expanding rm in a boom. We leave these highly interesting questions for
future work. We will undertake below a comparative static analysis, however, to understand
how changes of p=a a¤ect an individuals behaviour.
The third functional form species how tension is actually reduced. The rst term 0W
captures the ability of an individual to reduce stress by doing nothing. One can draw an
analogy from 0 to a depreciation parameter e.g. for physical capital. Here, 0 > 0 denotes
an individuals autonomous stress reduction ability. As time goes by, emotional tension ceteris
paribus reduces. The second term captures the intentional coping mechanism of the individual.
Coping measures m have a linear e¤ect, given the productivity parameter 1; on the reduction
of tension. The higher 1 > 0; the more smooth coping measures reduces stress.
The nal functional form xes the e¤ect of surprises g (t) on tension. We view the random
surprise as something objective which translates into a jump of stress via the personality factor
 > 0: This factor could be identical to the personality factor  that translates daily hassles into
building up of stress. Our results do not depend on whether they di¤er or not. Psychologically
speaking, one would have to argue that the appraisal process is the same for daily hassles as
for rare events. As this seems questionable in such generality, we allow these two personality
factors to di¤er. We specify surprises to be proportional to the current stress level W (t) for
the same reason as we did it with daily hassles: one can expect a very relaxed individual with
identical personality  to react not as strongly to a surprise g (t) as another individual with a
higher tension level. The e¤ect of surprises has a minus sign as a positive surprise reduces the
stress level and a negative one increases it.
The functional form for consumption is driven by the cognitive load argument and the
functional forms for c = wl ([M  M (W )]") from (3). A simple version sets " = 1 and species
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labour supply l (:) to be the identity function and M (W ) to be linear in W . This implies that
consumption falls linearly in W
c = w [M   W ] ; (8e)
where  > 0 is the marginal e¤ect of stress on pre-emptying the memory system and thereby
on reducing consumption. Finally, the functional form for the instantaneous utility function
u (c) in (6) reads
u (c;W ) = c  W: (8f)
The marginal e¤ect of stress on utility is captured by the parameter  > 0; marginal utility
from consumption is denoted by v > 0:
For the choices made in (8), a closed-form solution for optimal coping m can be derived
under a simple parameter restriction.36 We nd




  0 + (w+ ) 
vM
; (9)












The restriction on the parameter space (9) basically requires that, given the choice of para-
meter values for the right-hand side in (9), the time preference rate needs to be equal to this
value and this value needs to be positive. We need to make sure in our comparative static
analysis that this condition is always satised. We will point out when this restriction will play
a role.37
Expression (10) for optimal coping reveals a lot of interesting and intuitive properties con-
cerning the choice of emotion regulation. Generally speaking, the determinants of smooth
coping measures are the costs (vM ; v0) and benets (; 1) from both smooth coping and from
outbursts and utility parameter :
Corollary 1 Smooth coping increases in vM and 1 and falls in  and v0: The e¤ect of the
concavity of the cost function as measured by  is ambiguous.38
The rise in 1 is clearly a productivity issue. When the tension reduction e¤ect of coping
rises, calm coping becomes more attractive and more communication takes place. On the other
hand, higher costs v0 of coping decreases its intensity. When the cost of outbursts vM increase,
calm coping measures also increase. This shows the trade-o¤ between these two means of
reducing tension. If the alternative (outbursts) is more costly, if talking is more e¢ cient, the
amount of talking rises. By contrast, if productivity of outbursts increases, if  becomes larger,
why spend a lot of time and e¤ort with smooth coping? Rather using the tough technology,
rather shouting and swearing occasionally is the preferred approach to becoming calm again.
36There is a long tradition for closed-form solutions in economics, nance and beyond. Closed-form solutions
under parameter restrictions have been used at least since Merton (1975). See Wälde (2005) for an application
in the analysis of endogenous growth cycles. A recent survey and extensions for closed-form solutions is in
Wälde (2011). See also the references in the introduction to optimal stopping problems for further examples.
37Further analysis has shown that that there are closed-form solutions for other functional forms. As is well
understood, solutions for almost any functional form but for specic quantitative values of parameters can be
obtained by numerical methods.
38Marginal cost of coping, (1 + ) v0m ; unambiguously rises in  as long as m > 1: When optimal commu-
nication levels are smaller than 1; the e¤ect becomes ambiguous.
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Interestingly, coping intensity is independent of the current stress levelW: Technically speak-
ing, we obtain this result as the value function V (:) in our closed form solution (see app. A.1)
falls linearly inW (t) : This means, intuitively speaking, that the reduction in the present value
V of life-time utility when behaving optimally is independent of the level of tension. When
tension reduces by one unit, life-time utility V always reduces by the same constant fraction.
Reducing tension is always good, but it is never better or worse to reduce tension at a high
tension level than to reducing it at a low tension level. Clearly other functional forms in (8)
would imply non-linearities and one can imagine that the attempt to reduce stress by smooth
coping can rise in W:39
4 Stress and coping patterns
4.1 Dynamics of stress and coping
4.1.1 Stress in the absence of surprises
In a world without surprises, stress evolves in a deterministic manner. What does this model
predict about the choice of coping strategies? Would an individual ever be that stressed such
that an outburst would occur? Can outbursts be predicted with certainty in a determinis-
tic world? Or would the individual exclusively employ the smooth coping channel to reduce
tension? Both can actually occur as we will see shortly.
In a world without surprises, emotional tension described in (5) evolves in a deterministic
fashion. Using the functional forms from (8), tension follows (see web app. B.2.2)
_W (t) = W (t)  1m (11)
where _W (t)  dW (t) =dt denotes the time derivative. This equation employs the denition of




Smooth coping intensity m in (11) is now the optimally chosen level from (10). Whenever the
tension level W is hit, an outburst occurs and tension reduces by a discrete amount as described
in (4), W = W  :
To understand (11) and (12), let us view pressure relative to ability as something objective,
something that can be measured in a fairly consistent way. As an example, think of the number
of students asking for advice per day relative to your stock of experience in advice giving or in
handling students, measured e.g. in number of student contacts since tenure. How this relative
pressure then a¤ects tension building up depends a lot on individual personality as captured by
. Individuals with a high  experience a faster increase in emotional tension, given a certain
relative pressure, than others. The growth rate of stress is also characterized by the individuals
autonomous stress reduction mechanism, captured by 0: For individuals with a high 0; taking
a deep breath is enough to be back to zero, i.e. to quickly digest anything that might have
increased tension. For others with a low 0; it takes a very long time to reduce tension. Finally,
there are smooth coping measures allowing to reduce tension. The term 1m captures the ow
39Returning to the issue of an endogenous labour supply discussed in footnote 35, we would obtain an
additional rst-order condition xing hours worked. We would conjecture that labour supply falls in the current
stress level and, for a given stress-level, is higher for stress-resistant individuals than for stress-prone individuals
(see the denitions below). Stress-prone individuals might actually quit their job completely by setting labour
supply to zero. A precise analysis requires a numerical solution of the Bellman equation and is therefore left
for future research.
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of stress-reducing e¤ects of coping m given a productivity parameter 1: Coping stands e.g.
for the number of hours per day talking to friends. Individuals with high productivity 1 talk
about an issue for a couple of minutes and work out for themselves the essential points while
for others it takes hours and a repeated coming back to the same points over and over again
to obtain the same reduction in tension.
 Properties of the di¤erential equation for stress





When the stress level of an individual is at this level, it does not change. The question arises,
however, whether this stress level is positive or negative and, more importantly, whether it is
stable or not. If it is unstable, any small disturbance of the equilibrium tension level would push
the individual on a trajectory where the stress level changes over time. A long-run stationary
equilibrium might actually not exist and tension could permanently change.
The dynamic predictions of the model are pinned down once we x the sign of  in (11)
and the level of W  in (13). Figure 2 illustrates two of the three qualitatively relevant cases
and thereby allows to understand the dynamics of stress and coping.
Figure 2 The phase diagram for the dynamics of stress W (t)
The horizontal axis plots the tension levelW (t) while the vertical axis shows its change over
time. For a tension level of zero, the change in tension from (11) is given by _W (t) =  1m.
Stress would (technically) reduce further at W = 0: As stress can not become negative by
normalization, the point (0; 1m) is a stable steady state. Any small disturbance to emotional
tension would always bring the individual back to this steady state. As discussed after (5), this
can be associated with being in ow.
As  1m < 0, an assumption on the slope  of _W in (11) xes the sign of the steady state
W  from (13). To understand di¤erent patterns of stress and coping, the gures distinguishes
between a positive and a negative slope :When the slope is positive, there is a second (positive)
steady state atW :When the slope is negative, the sign of the corresponding steady state would
be negative. As g. 2 unambiguously shows, the steady state at W  is unstable. Stress falls to
the left of W  but rises to the right.40
40The third qualitatively relevant case occurs when the growth rate of stress is positive but the steady state
W  lies to the right of the tolerance level W: We will return to this case further below.
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4.1.2 The role of surprises
Surprises make the life of individuals uncertain. Stress levels no longer evolve over time in some
deterministically predictable way but are subject to random shocks. The evolution of stress is
then described by a generalization to the ordinary di¤erential equation (11). The generalization
is captured by the stochastic di¤erential equation
dW (t) = fW (t)  1mg dt   [h (t)  ] dq (t) : (14)
The deterministic part of this stochastic di¤erential equation is identical to (11). The frequency
of random shocks is determined by the Poisson process q (t) known from (5). The change in the
level of stress following a surprise depends on the surprises per se, as specied in (1) and the
individuals evaluation as in (14) specied by (8d). Returning to the evidence reported at the
end of sect. 2.1, a positive cash transfer would imply h (t) >  and a job-loss or bad weather
conditions would correspond to h (t) < .
As an implication, an individual faces an uncertain future described by a distribution of




as in the deterministic
world. Any negative surprise pushing stress above W yields outbursts (or cascades of outbursts)
such that W (t) 2 0; W  at each moment in time.
4.2 Theory-consistent personality types
The predictability of outbursts and the stability or instability of stress can best be understood
when introducing the concepts of stress-prone and stress-resistant individuals and of good and
bad stabilizers. The idea behind these four denitions is to distinguish between individuals per
se (stress-prone or resistant) and between individuals conditional on a given stress level.






















This denition is most informative for a world without surprises. It is obvious that with
su¢ ciently frequent or strong negative surprises, every individual can display outbursts. It is
also informative under the natural assumption that we consider individuals only whose initial




:With an exogenous initial stress level higher than W; an outburst
would also be observed for any individual.
 The stress-prone individual
A stress-prone individual is characterized in g. 2 by the line going through the steady state
W . If the current tension level is only a tiny amount below W ; the stress level falls over
time. The steady state W  can therefore rather be called a threshold level above which the
stress level rises. The latter feature is actually the idea behind the labeling stress-prone. A
stress-prone individual is characterized by personal abilities a; personality characteristics  and
stress processing abilities 0 such that for the given level of demands p; the future evolution of
tension crucially depends on the current tension level. If the individual is relatively calm (the
current W is below the threshold W ), the individual smoothly reduces tension by consciously
chosen smooth coping m and by the autonomous process captured by 0: If this individual
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happens to have a high current stress level with W being above the threshold W  (see below
for surprises and how they can push the individual above or below W ), stress will continue to
rise over time! The individual is doomed to hit the maximum stress level W where an emotional
outburst will occur.
For such an individual one can predict for any tension level whether an outbursts will occur.
For W > W ; the time span until the next outburst and the frequency of outbursts can be
computed (see prop. 4 below). To make a simple example: Imagine a person working in a
team and a colleague notorious for occasional outbursts. If the person has the feeling that the
colleagues tension level lies above the threshold W ; the person should make sure not to see
the colleague too often during the day. Otherwise the person might be hit by an outburst.
The speed with which an individuals stress level changes is an exponential function of time
 and described by the solution to (11) that reads (see web app. B.2.2)
W () = (W (t) W ) e[ t] +W : (15)
The growth rate of stress  displayed in this equation and dened in (12) has an interesting
interpretation: Current requirements p and ability a translate into stress accumulation as
a function of personality characteristic ; measuring how strongly p=a a¤ects the individual
psychologically.41 At the same time, however, the individual is characterized by an autonomous
stress reduction process whose speed is driven by 0: If the individual takes things to heart,
i.e. has a high  and at the same time is not good at digesting stress autonomously, i.e. 0 is
low, stress levels change very quickly.
Note however that the individuals situation (p=a) and personality characteristics ( and 0)
both describe how quickly a stress prone individual accumulates and reduces stress. Consider
the situation where the stress-prone individual is a bad stabilizer, i.e. where the current stress
level W (t) in t is to the right of W  in g. 2. Then W (t) W  > 0 in (15) and the stress level
is accumulating at the rate of : A stress-prone individual can also be a good stabilizer where
the tension level is decreased over time. Here as well, the speed with which this happens is
: Hence, the rate  can actually also be considered as a measure of emotional stability of an
individual. For a given initial stress level W (t) ; individuals with lower  (and as long as  is
positive) will experience a slower change of their stress level than individuals with higher : In
some sense, behaviour of individuals with lower  can more easily be predicted than behaviour
of individuals with higher :
 The stress-resistant individual
While stress-prone individuals can be good or bad stabilizers, stress-resistant individuals
always experience falling stress levels, independently of their current stress level. Stress-resistant
individuals are therefore good stabilizers. Whether an individual is stress-resistant or not
entirely depends on the outburst level W and the growth rate  of stress from (12). For a
given W; the individual becomes stress-resistant as soon as  is su¢ ciently small. While a
negative  as drawn in g. 2 is a su¢ cient condition for being stress-resistant, this would not
be necessary. If  only becomes small enough such that stress falls for all stress levels between
0 and W; the individual is stress resistant. The speed with which tension changes is equally
described by (15).
4.3 The outburst theorem
Let us now turn to the question under which conditions emotional outbursts will (and will
not) take place. The question about outbursts is at the same time the question about the
41One might even want to argue that  is negative for some individuals who just get positively aroused from
successfully completing tasks. We restrict our analysis here to positive :
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optimal choice of stress-reduction technologies. In psychology, Gross (2008) in a survey article
on how individuals try to inuence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how
we experience and express these emotions(p. 497) writes that one intriguing puzzle is why
people use one emotion regulation strategy rather than another(p. 505). Seeing stress as an
emotion, our ndings on the occurrence of outbursts and the determinants of smooth coping
provides some answers.
By construction, emotional outbursts take place when the stress level hits or exceeds the
outburst level W: Apart from bad surprises, this can happen only for bad stabilizers. The
question is therefore under which conditions an individual turns, rst, into a stress-prone indi-
vidual and, then, into a bad stabilizer. We characterize an individual by personality (; a; W ),
by parameters that a¤ect stress regulation only (v0; ; 0; 1; vM ;), by the situation (p) and
by the current tension level W (t).
The central relationships are in the following
Proposition 2 (Outburst theorem) An individual is
(i) stress-prone if and only if (a) the growth rate of stress is positive,  > 0; and (b) the
threshold level is smaller than the tolerance level, W  < W:








(iii) The individual turns into a bad stabilizer when (16) holds and the current stress level








Outbursts will occur in nite time.
Proof. See app. A.2
Condition (16) as an equality is depicted in g. 3 as the thick solid line marked W  = W:
The horizontal axis plots the individuals autonomous stress reduction ability 0: The vertical
axis plots  p
a
as these parameters occur jointly only. Condition (16) as an equality separates
stress-prone individuals above this line from stress-resistant individuals on or below the line.
When (16) holds as an inequality, the individual lies above the thick solid line.
Whether a stress-prone individual displays outbursts depends on the current stress level.
When we x the stress level W (t) and ask which type of individual would display outbursts in
nite time, then we obtain (17). All individuals with p=a su¢ ciently high such that (17) holds
as an inequality, can cope with such a stress level only by employing the outburst-technology
as a means to reduce stress.
When we then ask under which conditions outbursts do not occur, i.e. when we nd an
individual below the thick solid line, then this can be actually true for two reasons. First, an
individual is stress resistant per se, i.e. even when coping measures are absent (m = 0). This
is the case for a negative growth rate of stress,  < 0. Or an individual is stress-resistant due
to a su¢ ciently high level of smooth coping measures. These individuals are characterized by
a positive growth rate of stress,  > 0. But this rate is so low, given the negative intercept
 1m; that the threshold level W  lies to the right of (or just at) W: Outbursts therefore never
occur (in the absence of negative surprises).42
42The case of W  > W is the third qualitative case. It was not depicted in g. 2 which only displays two
cases.
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Figure 3 Stress-resistant and stress-prone individuals and regions of bad stabilizers implying
emotional outbursts
This gures nicely allows us to summarize conditions for being stress-resistant and stress-
prone in the following
Corollary 2 (Determinants of emotional outbursts)
(a) For a given autonomous stress-reduction potential 0; an individual will be (unconditionally)
stress-resistant if p=a is su¢ ciently low.
(b) For a given autonomous stress-reduction potential 0; an individual will be stress-resistant
if coping activities are su¢ ciently high or the tolerance level W is su¢ ciently low.
(c) For a given autonomous stress-reduction potential 0, a given coping level m and a given
tolerance level W; an individual will be stress-prone if p=a is too high.
(d) An individual is a bad stabilizer if p=a rises further.
We see from the above ndings that, taking a situation p and an individuals ability a
as xed, personality is crucial. The appraisal parameter  and stress reduction abilities 0
determine whether an individual is stress-resistant or stress-prone. How one looks at the world,
i.e. how an individual perceives and evaluates stressors is crucial for determining whether the
individual will display emotional outbursts or not. If  is only su¢ ciently small (however large
the intensity of stressors), the individual will remain calm and not display outbursts. Similarly
for the autonomous stress reduction ability 0; when we x p=a and move horizontally through
the gure. If it is only su¢ ciently high, an individual will not display outbursts.
What is the role of controlled coping m? For a given set of parameters (other than those
xing m), any parameter that increases m reduces the risk of an outburst. Trying to reduce
ones tension level e.g. by talking through stressors and their implications for ones well-being
should help. One can even say more: For a given set of parameters and a given tension level
W (t) ; there is a coping intensity m that makes sure that outbursts can be avoided.
4.4 Temporary stressors and permanent stress?
Let us now return to our world with uncertainty, i.e. we now allow for positive and negative
surprises as presented in (1). The impact of surprises can also be best understood when we
distinguish between stress-resistant and stress-prone individuals. Fig. 4 shows the evolution of
stress for a given realization of surprises.
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We assume that both individuals are good stabilizers to start with. As a consequence,
their tension levels fall. Now we allow for a negative surprise after a day, i.e. at t = 24,
meaning that h (t)    < 0: As a consequence, stress of both goes up by the same amount
given by dW (t) =  [h (t)  ] from (14) with dq (t) = 1 and dt = 0 (meaning the jump is
instantaneous). We assume that the increase in stress is not enough to push the stress-prone
individual above the threshold level W : Both individuals therefore continue reducing their
stress level.
When the next surprise comes early (the stress level is still high) or the negative surprise
is stronger, stress levels of both individuals will be pushed up to an even higher level than
before. This takes place at t = 38 in our gure. The subsequent evolution of stress for the
stress-prone and the stress-resistant individual are now di¤erent. The stress-prone individual
will now experience a rise in stress while the stress level of the stress-resistant individual goes
down. An identical history of surprises leads to an almost identical history of stress up to
the point where stress crosses the threshold level W  for the stress-prone individual. As of
this level, the stress-prone individual is a bad stabilizers and is heading towards an emotional
outburst. The outburst takes place in this example at t = 91: The stress-resistant individuals
stress level keeps falling over time.








Evolution of stress under surprises
stress-prone
stress-resistant
Figure 4 Emotional tension for a stress-resistant a stress-prone individual (right panel) under
identical surprises
While g. 4 just illustrates one possible realization for surprises and the evolution of stress
for stress-resistant and stress-prone individuals, this example points to a more general nding.
Proposition 3 A temporary surprise only temporarily changes the stress level of an individual
if the individual is stress resistant. A temporary surprise will have a permanent e¤ect on an
individuals stress level if (i) the individual is stress prone and (ii) if the temporary surprise
pushes the individuals stress level above or below the threshold level W .
Clearly, a temporary surprise for a stress prone individual can make changes towards the
good or the bad. A positive surprise can push the individual from outbursts that occur at the
frequency (18) to an evolution of stress that eventually leads to being fully relaxed. In the bad
case, a negative surprise would lift the individual above W  and frequently recurring outbursts
would result.
This nding helps to inform further empirical work e.g. on the e¤ect of poverty alleviation
on psychological well-being. Haushofer and Fehr (2014) conclude that little is known about
whether poverty alleviation leads to a permanent or only temporary increase in psychological
well-being. Our theoretical analysis suggests that it depends on (i) how strong a positive
surprise (through poverty alleviation) is and on (ii) the personality of a person.
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5 How to deal with emotional outbursts?
We have now understood under which conditions emotional outbursts occur. We now take a
slightly enlarged perspective and ask what the e¤ects were if an individual could change the
tolerance level. We also ask how often outbursts can occur and how an individual displaying
outbursts could react to them in some deeper (personality) sense.
5.1 Is suppressing outbursts a good idea?
Given the general belief that emotional outbursts are not desirable from a social point of view,
a bad stabilizer might feel encouraged to increase the tolerance level W: Imagine an individual
could train self-control to inhibit or at least postpone the outburst to a higher stress level.
What is the e¤ect of a higher W?
Figure 5 The e¤ect of a higher outburst level W
We start by looking at a stress-prone individual. One e¤ect of a higher W is denitely
desirable the next outburst comes later. Starting an epsilon to the right of the threshold level
W ; the outburst occurs later when the outburst level is Wnew as compared to Wold: Leaving
the outburst level Wold where it is, however, implies that an outburst by (4) pushes the stress-
prone individual to the left of the threshold level W : The individual therefore becomes a good
stabilizer, reduces stress and eventually ends up at the stress-free level W = 0. An outburst
truly helped the individual in permanently reducing stress.
If the same individual had an outburst at the higher level Wnew; the outburst would also
reduce stress by the discrete amount of:Now, however, the individual remains a bad stabilizer.
The individual experiences rising stress levels again and will soon have the next outburst. With
a higher Wnew; the individual is caught in an outburst cycle: When at Wnew ; stress increases
smoothly and only controlled coping behaviour is observed. Once at Wnew, an outburst takes
place and the individual is thrown back to Wnew   and so on. Increasing the outburst level
therefore might lead to more rather than to fewer outbursts.
5.2 The frequency of outbursts
Having understood conditions for the occurrence of outbursts, we now ask how frequently they
occur. If an individual is very good at reducing the tension level via an outburst, i.e. if 
is su¢ ciently large, an outburst will happen only once and never again. This is the situation
described in g. 5 for Wold. If the individual is not that talented and an outburst predicts the
next outburst (as with Wnew), one can compute the frequency with which outbursts occur. This
is summarized in the following
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Proposition 4 (Frequency of emotional outbursts)
(i) A bad stabilizer with a low e¤ectiveness  of outbursts will experience outbursts with a
frequency of T 1 per unit of time where
T 1 = = ln
W  W 
W   W  : (18)
(ii) The frequency T 1 of outbursts rises, the higher the growth rate of stress , the higher










(iii) The e¤ect of  on the frequency T 1 of outbursts is ambiguous.
Proof. see app. A.3
The result that the growth rate of stress  increases the frequency of outbursts is due to the
nding discussed after (15) that a high growth rate of stress leads to fast changes of stress level.
A bad stabilizer experiencing an outburst leading to a discrete and fast reduction of stress will
see stress build up quickly again, which then leads to the next outburst.
The result that a higher outburst level leads to a higher frequency of outbursts again indi-
cates that outbursts at high stress levels might not be as desirable as outbursts at low stress
levels. This reminds of the nding discussed in g. 5. Here the higher frequency of outbursts at
higher stress levels result from the fact that speed with which stress grows is faster, the further
the current stress level is distant from the threshold level W : Looking at (15) clearly shows
that if the initial stress level W (t) after an outburst, i.e. W   is higher, the speed of stress
accumulation at an invariant growth rate of stress rises.
The nding on the steady state level W  is comforting. The steady state rises, inter alia, in
optimally chosen coping measures m: The more an individual nds it optimal to e.g. talk to a
friend, the lower the frequency of outbursts. The reason for this lies again in the speed of stress
accumulation at an invariant growth rate of stress. When W  is high, the stress level W  
after an outburst can not be too far from W  such that it takes a lot of time for accumulating
stress again.
The ambiguous e¤ect of the e¢ ciency  of an outburst results from two channels. The
direct e¤ect of  decreases the frequency as can be seen from (18). The e¢ ciency  also has an
indirect e¤ect via optimal coping m and thereby via the threshold level W : A higher outburst
e¢ ciency makes outbursts more attractive as compared to smooth coping (10). Less coping
reduces the threshold level and therefore increases the speed with which stress is accumulated
(the time derivative _W to be precise) at W  and higher. The frequency of outbursts therefore
increases through the indirect channel. The overall e¤ect is therefore ambiguous.
5.3 The gains from psychotherapy
Imagine our individual could undergo psychotherapy. This would allow him to inuence some
appraisal processes or undertake some reappraisals, i.e. adjust the way he evaluates certain
stressors. In terms of our model, this would mean that the individual would be able to adjust
certain personality parameters like , 0 and 1,  and  or even opt for a di¤erent environment
that provides a lower intensity p=a of stressors (e.g. change jobs). The former would be examples
of an emotion-focused strategy and the latter of a problem-focused strategy to reduce stress.
Even though endogenizing the costs of going through therapy has to be postponed to future
research, we can still provide measures of the benets of such therapy.43
43I am grateful to Ernst Fehr for having suggested that such an analysis can be undertaken in this context.
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If we want to understand how emotion- or problem-focused therapies would allow to reduce
the occurrence of frequency of outbursts, we can simply go back to the outburst theorem in
prop. 2 or to the frequency results in prop. 4. We would then nd that outbursts can be avoided
if the following changes are su¢ ciently large: (i) coping measures m increase, (ii) the intensity
of stress is appraised in a less threatening way, i.e. if  goes down, (iii) the autonomous stress
reduction ability 0 rises or (iv) the productivity 1 with which coping measures reduce tension
increases.
At some deeper level, however, one would like to understand how therapy a¤ects well-
being of an individual and not just a certain characteristic behaviour. Empirically speaking,
measures of well-being can be obtained in at least in two ways: subjective reporting based on
questionnaires or on experience sampling (see e.g. Krueger and Schkade, 2008). Answers to
questionnaires are usually understood to be a highly cognitive, e¤ortful and reective process.
By contrast, a spontaneous report of a current feeling by experience sampling at repeated but
random points in time seems a more immediate and less cognitively controlled measure. To
the extent that the value function is a measure that takes current state variables and the entire
future of control variables into account, the value function sounds more like the outcome of
a reective process. We therefore feel justied in equating the value function to subjective
well-being and make a prediction about the e¤ects of psychotherapy on subjective well-being
as reported in questionnaires.44 We start from the following






: Subjective well-being, aka the value function V (W ) of the individual, is then
given by






















Proof. See app. A.1
The value function has intuitive properties. First, it falls in the stress-level W; where the
slope is given by the ratio of the cost vM to the benet  of the outburst. Second, the value
for a fully relaxed individual (W = 0) is given by 0 which captures many aspects coming from
the structure of the Bellman equation. They include on the right hand side of (20) (parts of
the expressions for) the benets from consumption, the costs of coping, the benets of coping
and the inuence of surprises.
Given these ndings, we can now ask how strongly well-being changes as a result of therapy.
Formally, we would like to understand the derivative of the value function with respect to any of
the parameters of interest (, 0 and 1,  and ). This is technically straightforward for 1, 
and : An individual that becomes more productive in using his time for coping measures (just
talk 10 minutes to a friend instead of 20 to experience the same amount of stress reduction)
enjoys a higher V (W ). The result for a decrease of  is ambiguous: A priori, a less emotional
response to surprises via a lower  appears desirable. Equation (20), however, tells us that
becoming less emotional can have positive or negative e¤ects. If an individual is on average
positively surprised, i.e. if Ehh > ; subjective well-being of the individual actually falls if
the person becomes less emotional. Therapy attempting to make an individual emotionally
44An immediate implication of this argument states that the appropriate theoretical counterpart for experience
sampling would be the instantaneous utility function.
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more stable is therefore only advisable if the individual tends to be negatively surprised, i.e. if
Ehh < . If therapy could inuence both the degree  of optimism and appraisal  of surprises,
one should aim at reducing  and increasing : The individual should expect less and become
more emotional.
When we want to compute derivatives with respect to  and 0; it is not so clear how such
a derivative has to be computed given the parameter restriction (9). For the derivative to be
true, we need to make sure that this restriction also holds after the derivative, i.e. when the
parameter is a tiny bit larger. To make sure that this holds, we need to compute derivatives
such that the parameter restriction (9) is valid for all values of the parameter we are interested
in.
To make an example, we start with ; the appraisal of daily hassles as captured by the
intensity p=a of the stressor. Imagine the individual lives in an environment where daily hassles
exceed daily uplifts such that p > 0. Then, a decrease of ; i.e. a more relaxed appraisal
or a less worriedevaluation of stressors, would by (11) and (12) imply that stress does not
increase that quickly. What are the utility e¤ects for the individual? As we cannot compute the
derivative of V (W ) with respect to  given that  appears in the constraint (9), we undertake
the following thought experiment.
Imagine we want to understand the e¤ect of therapy on an individual that experiences a
rise in the intensity of stressors. In other words, we want to understand the e¤ect of a decrease
in  when p=a increases such that p=a in (9) remains constant. Given this constant p=a;
we know that (9) holds for any combination of values of  and p=a we look at. We can then
conclude that therapy allowing an individual to better cope with more stressors is benecial
for the individual: The individual feels just as well (the value function V (W ) does not change
as the path of stress W is unchanged), even though the intensity of stressors increased.
We can then understand the e¤ect of an increase in the autonomous stress-reduction ability
0 in the same way. Imagine again the intensity p=a of the stressors goes up. If at the same
time the ability 0 increases such that  in (9) remains constant, we can conclude that a therapy
increasing 0 allows the individual to better cope with more stress. (Note that in contrast to
the change in ; where the impact on the stress level was unchanged, here we do get more stress
as p=a goes up but this higher propensity of stress creation is immediately compensated for
by higher 0.)
With these lines of reasoning, we can summarize the e¤ects of therapy in the following
Corollary 3 A therapy increases subjective well-being V (W ) of the individual if
(i) the individuals productivity 1 in coping m rises
(ii) the individual becomes emotionally more stable ( falls) conditional on the individual being
on average negatively surprised
(iii) the individual becomes more emotional ( rises) conditional on the individual being on
average positively surprised,
(iv) the individual reduces expectations with respect to surprises ( falls) as this leads to positive
surprises more often.
The results from our thought experiments are summarized in the following
Corollary 4 A therapy allows an individual to keep its level of subjective well-being despite a
rise in the intensity of stressors if
(i) the individual succeeds in reacting less emotional (lower ) to daily hassles
(ii) the individual manages to improve his autonomous stress reduction potential (increase 0).
A more general insight from these analyses points to the fact that there is an optimal degree
of emotional responses. Just as individuals can be too emotional (when living in worlds with
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negative surprises and daily hassles), individuals might be too little emotional (when living a
world with lots of positive surprises and daily uplifts). The optimal outcome would therefore
consist in making an individual more emotional (increase ) but let him expect less (decrease
). A reduction in  making the individual less susceptible to daily hassles and an increase in
stress reduction productivities 0 and 1 then completes optimization of emotion regulation. A
full theory of therapywould have to wait for convincing specications of costs arising from
these changes in personality.
5.4 Structurally estimating personality
Our setup stresses that there is a large heterogeneity in how stressors translate into stress.
Individuals exhibit heterogeneous behaviour in identical situations given their heterogeneous
appraisal of stressors. This stressor-stress link is captured by personality traits and coping
dispositions in our setup. Looking at (14) with (12), the central parameters in this respect are
 for translating daily hassle into changes of stress, 0 and 1 for how quickly an individual
can reduce stress and  how strongly an individual reacts to surprises. The general optimism
parameter  also captures a personality dimension. With this framework, we dened theory-
consistent personality types in sect. 4.2.
It is then a natural question to ask how these parameters and personality types can be recon-
ciled with the more standard measures of personality like e.g. the Big 5.45 These ve measures
are usually called neuroticism(the ease and frequency with which a person becomes upset
and distressed), agreeableness(agreeable individuals get less angry over otherstransgres-
sions than do less agreeable people) and conscientiousness (in the sense of taking future
contingencies into account, all quotes from Carver and Connor-Smith, 2010). The remaining
two personality factors, extraversionand openness to experience, play a less important role
in our framework.
To systematically establish a link between the personality parameters in the model (, 0
and 1,  and ) and the questions underlying the Big 5 personality measures, one could
proceed as follows. The dependent variable could be behaviour, say the frequency of outbursts,
or self-reports on stress W (t) : Explanatory variables are stressors (p and h (t)) in addition to
various control variables (like education, occupation, age etc) that capture inter alia ability a.
In an exploratory setup, one would estimate the e¤ects of BIG 5 measures on the dependent
variable in a linear regression. For a structural interpretation of personality characteristics,
however, it would be more interesting to jointly estimate standard model parameters (like
preference parameters) with the models personality parameters. The current state of the art
(see e.g. Heckman et al., 2006 or Conti et al., 2014) uses linear simultaneous equation models
with latent factors as explanatory variables (see Piatek, 2010 for an introduction). The ideal
approach building on models like the one developed here would use the density provided by
the theoretical model (e.g. on outbursts or stress) for the formulation of a likelihood function
combined with the densities of the latent variables. The di¤erence to existing analyses would
consist in the closer link of the personality estimates to the theoretical model resulting from
the use of the model density for estimation. This would not only be interesting for the present
stress-coping model but also more generally for improving our theoretical understanding of the
factors explaining the answers in standard questionnaires for personality.
More in detail, estimation would employ two equations. The rst one results from the theo-
retical model and provides us with a closed-form expression of the density of stress g (W ji; Xi; ) :
This density is conditional on the latent personality factors i = f; 0; 1; ; g, covariates Xi
45See e.g. John et al. (2008) for a psychological perspective and Borghans et al. (2008) for rst steps
towards integrating economics and personality psychology. Borghans et al. provide, inter alia, a criticism of the
atheoretical nature of the Big 5 personality measures and compare it to other taxonomies of personality.
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and model parameters  (other than latent personality factors, i.e.  = f; v0; ; ; v; g)
Wi~g (W ji; Xi; ) ;
Y i = Xi + i + "i:
The second equation explains latent outcomes Y i of personality by covariates X (like p, a
and w), latent personality factors i, factor loadings  and the error term "i: Employing the
density from the theoretical model in the likelihood function then makes sure that the estimated
personality factors ^i obtain a very precise meaning.46 This would be an advantage not only
for the present analysis but also for studies of personality in economics and in psychology more
generally.
6 Conclusion
The feeling of being stressed is known by everybody. At times, demands on the job, by family
or from friends just exceed personal abilities. Demands beyond abilities imply stress. But
why is it that some individuals remain calm even in times of highest work load while others
start becoming nervous and might even display strong emotional reactions? This paper has
presented a model that builds on concepts borrowed from psychology and translates them into
standard economic model building. This yields the huge advantage that we can now, to return
to Rabin (2013a) again, understand what concepts in psychology actually mean, to understand
where the aws are and to see their limits that guide us in further advancing our knowledge.
We have seen that stress is an inherently dynamic concept. Stress builds up gradually as
a function of appraisals of stressors. Stressors can come as a surprise or they are present at
each instant. Surprises can be positive or negative, daily stressors can be uplifts, which would
reduce stress again only gradually and slowly over time. We have also seen how some of the
most popular concepts in psychology, cognitive load and mental resource constraints, can easily
be introduced into economic models. We have understood how such a resource constraint can
be used to easily understand how stress reduces performance of an individual on the job.
When it comes to optimal reactions to stress, this paper formalizes many of the psychological
views about functional vs. dysfunctional, problem-focused vs. emotion-focused and reective
(rational) vs. automatic (impulsive) strategies. We understood using an optimal stopping
framework for optimal stress reactions that the distinction between reective and impulsive
strategies is not so clear-cut after all: If an individual knows about automatic behaviour, it
should anticipate this automatic behaviour. In this sense, the automatic behaviour is automatic
in this particular situation (technically speaking where the state variable stress W (t) reaches
a certain tolerance level W ), but this automatic behaviour is anticipated and thereby at least
to some extent under the control of the individual. Boundedly rational behaviour combined
with rational behaviour becomes semi-boundedly rational behaviour. This can be seen as
an implementation of Rabins (2013b) suggestion to use neoclassical optimization models to
integrate limits to rationality.
Our setup allows us to understand stress and coping patterns given optimal stress regulation
of an individual. We saw that emotional outbursts, the socially less desirable coping strategy,
occurs at predictable points in time. All individuals employ smooth and constructive stress-
coping strategies for some time. These strategies help reducing the current stress level (or at
least reduce the speed with which stress builds up). But in certain cases, it might be optimal to
allow emotional outbursts to take place. After all, socially desirable or not, emotional outbursts
are just one out of two technologies to reduce emotional tension. If various technologies are
available to achieve a certain goal (here: stress reduction), it is not surprising to see that
46I am grateful to Rémi Piatek for discussions of aspects related to latent factor models.
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optimizing individuals employ both technologies. We have also seen that suppressing outbursts
might lead to outburst cycles which would not have occurred if the individual had allowed the
outburst to occur immediately.
The entire analysis builds on the distinction between two types of individuals: stress-prone
and stress-resistant individuals. The advantage of this denition of individual personality is
its theoretical consistency. Psychological measures of personality (think about the Big 5) are
based on questionnaire answers and factor analysis. The paper works out which steps would
have to be undertaken in order to structurally estimate theory-consistent personality measures.
Using this distinction, we have seen that temporary shocks (e.g. a short stressful event at work)
can have permanent e¤ects on the stress-level on an individual if the latter is stress-prone. To
put it positively, for a stress-resistant individual, any temporary stressful event will not prevent
him to eventually return to low stress-levels once the event is over.
What do we learn generally about how desirable emotions are for individual well-being?
Surprisingly, it depends on a persons environment and further personality characteristics. If
there were means to change a persons personality (think of psychotherapy), one would not
necessarily want emotion-free individuals. Emotions can be of a big advantage for wellbeing:
If individuals expect little from the world (their subjective expectation  is low), they are
more often positively surprised than they are negatively surprised. If they than value these
positive surprises more strongly (their appraisal parameter ), they are very close to an optimal
emotional structure.
The analysis suggests many further questions that should be studied in the future. The
reaction of individuals to stress beyond stress regulation should be studied jointly with this
setup. As discussed in footnote 35, labour supply reactions would display interesting patterns.
The role cognitive load plays could be elaborated further. As an example, one might want to
take into account that an individuals ability a to react to demand p is a function of cognitive
load as well. Stress does not only reduce e¤ective labour input but also reduces an individuals
ability to react to stressors. One can also study the role of stress on consumption and saving
behaviour. Do stressed individuals consume more to compensate for being stressed? Going
beyond the individual level, one can think about the management of rms, about principal-
agent problems where a principal optimally chooses the amount of pressure put on an agent in
order to achieve optimal output. This can then easily be extended to allow for groups and how
the stress-level in a group works as a coordination device that helps to coordinate collective
action. Interaction between a small number of individuals at the same hierarchy level, as a
team in a rm or in an intimate partnership, where outbursts of one team member exerts
a negative externality on the other team member, would then be a natural next step to be
analysed. Finally, the e¤ects of stress on health and health costs at the aggregate level are also
worth being considered.
A Appendix
A.1 The solution to the maximization problem
The Bellman equation for the case where W (t) < W reads
V (W (t)) = max
m(t)
(
















The rst-order condition for m (t) in (A.1) requires
v0 (m (t)) =  V 0 (W (t)) @
@m (t)
 (m (t) ;W (t)) : (A.2)
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Assuming an interior solution, marginal costs from coping, v0 (m (t)), must equal marginal
gains,  V 0 (W (t)) @
@m(t)
 (m (t) ;W (t)) : As stress W (t) is a badand not a good, V 0 (W (t))
is negative and the right-hand side of this rst-order condition indeed reects a positive marginal
gain. The rst-order condition implicitly makes optimal coping a function of tension, m (t) =
m (W (t)) : For W (t)  W; stress reduces instantaneously by (4) and the value matching
condition (7) holds.
For the functional forms from (8), the Bellman equation and the rst-order condition read
V (W ) = max
m

u (c;W )  v0m1+ + V 0 (W ) [W   1m] + 

EhV (W   g)  V (W )	 ;
(1 + ) v0m
 =  V 0 (W ) 1:
We start with a guess J (W ) for the value function V (W ) which reads J (W ) = 0 1W: The
guess implies J 0 (W ) =  1 and gives us two free parameters, 0 and 1:
We need to verify that this guess satises the value-matching condition, the rst-order
condition and the Bellman equation. The value-matching condition (7) is satised if the rst
parameter 1 satises




The rst-order condition (A.2) is satised if (1 + ) v0m = 11 = 1 v
M

; where the second
















Finally, the Bellman equation with u (c;W ) from (8f) and consumption from (8e) holds if two
conditions are fullled simultaneously (see the web appendix for more details on the rearrange-
ments). The rst is the parameter restriction (9) in the main text. The second pins down 0
from our guess which needs to satisfy







A.2 Proof of the outburst theorem
Proof of (i): We know from (11) that tension falls in a neighborhood of (0; 1m) for both the
stress-prone and the stress-resistant individual (see g. 2 for an illustration). If the growth rate
of stress  is negative, the threshold level W  from (13) is negative as well and the individual
never displays outbursts. Hence, a necessary condition for outbursts to occur is  > 0 which
is (a) in the theorem.
By construction, W (t) 2 0; W  : For modestly positive ; it could result that W  > W
(see again g. 2). Hence, we need W  < W which is condition (b).
Proof of (ii): The necessary condition (a) to be a bad stabilizer reads with (12)
 > 0, p
a
> 0: (A.4)
Condition (b) reads with (13)
W  < W , 1m

< W ,  > 1mW (A.5)
31
where the second if and only ifused  > 0 from the necessary condition (a). Plugging in
 =  p
a
  0 from (12), both necessary conditions are satised i¤







Proof of (iii): We understand the role of W (t) by remembering that from (13) and (12),





 0 : For a given stress level W (t) ; we can ask whether W
 is larger or smaller
than W (t) : Under equality, W (t) = W  = 1m
 p
a
 0 : Solving this for 
p
a
in an attempt to draw








A.3 The frequency of outbursts
Given the solution in (15), the length of time T between two outbursts, i.e. how long it takes
for an outburst to occur when the current stress level is W (t) = W  ; is
W = W  +
 
W   W  eT , T =  1 ln W  W W   W  :
The inverse T 1 is then the frequency of outbursts presented in prop. 4.
For simplicity, we compute the comparative static properties of T: In prop. 4, we report the
comparative static properties of T 1.
(a) The e¤ect dT=d < 0 is immediately visible.






W   W  =
    W   W +   W  W  
W   W 2 =   W   W 2 > 0
(A.7)






W   W  =
W   W      W  W  
W   W 2 =    W   W 2 < 0






W   W  > 0:




















  0 : (A.8)
The threshold W  is therefore a decreasing function in :





F (W  () ;) =










@W () > 0 from (A.7) and
dW ()
d
< 0 from (A.8) but @
@
F (W  () ;) > 0 (the
direct e¤ect), the sign is ambiguous.
The web appendix is available at www.waelde.com/pub.
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